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Abstract 
Public officials’ communication has been explored at length in terms of how such their 
statements are conveyed in the traditional media, but minimal research has been done to examine 
their communication via social media. This paper explores the kinds of statements U.S. officials 
are making on Twitter in terms of the actions they are trying to achieve. We then analyze the 
correlation between these statements, Congressional communication network structures, and 
voting behavior. Our analysis leverages over 29,000 tweets by members of Congress in 
conjunction with existing DW-NOMINATE voting behavior data. We find that pro-social and 
self-promoting statements correlate with Congressional voting records but that position within 
the Congressional communication network does not correlate with voting behavior.  
Citation: Shapiro, M.A., Hemphill, L., and Otterbacher, J. (2012) Doing What I Say: Connecting 
Congressional Social Media Behavior and Congressional Voting. Midwest Political Science 
Association Meeting, Chicago, IL, April 12-15. 
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Introduction 
The polarizing statements that we hear our elected officials make on a seemingly regular 
basis are intentional and to generate a response from politicians or another key actor within the 
political sphere (Brady and Han 2006; Saunders and Abramowitz 2004). The subject has been 
explored in terms of how such statements are conveyed in the traditional media, but minimal 
research has been done with regard to the role of polarizing language within social media. We 
engage in a first-ever content analysis of the available Twitter accounts of each elected member 
of Congress as of August 2011 and provide answers to a number of the most sought-after 
questions in political communication: What can be gained from making polarizing statements? 
Do politicians ostracize the most polarizing (in terms of language use) of their cohort? Is there 
any consistency between the polarizing language used and the polarizing actions taken, and what 
would this mean for specific sub-groups in Congress? 
By identifying Twitter accounts for members of Congress and using the Twitter Database 
Server (Green 2011) and Twitter-collectors (Hemphill 2011), we gathered 29,694 tweets posted 
by 411 elected members of Congress between June 14, 2011 and August 23, 2011.1 Twitter 
usage generates networks when users establish “follow,” “reply,” and “mention” relationships 
with one another, and we are able to analyze those networks to reveal insights into a group’s 
dynamics via NodeXL (Smith et al. 2010). For instance, we can compare the networks of elected 
officials to determine whether they reach the public through Twitter or whether they establish a 
virtual “echo chamber” in which they only reach themselves. If the latter is true, “tweeting” 
would fall under a special category of political communication not unlike discussions in the halls 
of Congress. 
                                                
1 We also collected tweets in which officials were explicitly mentioned by other users who were not in our pool of 
public officials, and those included another 550,000+ tweets. 
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In order to identify these qualities and, as mentioned above, make clear their relationship 
to polarizing statements, we first outline the existing literature across three strata: a linguistic 
framework for understanding and coding Twitter based statements or “tweets”, political 
communication and social network analysis, and theories of ideological division and polarization 
in Congress. In each stratum, we find significant deficiencies in terms of what we know about 
the link between social media behavior and voting behavior, but this is to be expected given the 
nature of Twitter, its phenomenal surge over the last few years, and the inherent complexity of 
interpreting a political statement comprised of 140 characters or less. We then propose four 
hypotheses and outline the methods in which they are tested, especially the details of our 
iterative process of coding tweets. Our results, in line with the multifaceted theory development 
and literature review, are presented in terms of social network analysis and determinants of 
polarizing behavior. A final, concluding section then highlights our broad findings and proposes 
avenues for future research. 
Literature & Hypotheses 
Studies of political communication often focus on the language officials use in traditional 
media (Cook et al. 1983; Edwards III and Wood 1999; Entman 2007; Kedrowski 2000; Lee 
2009), but minimal research has examined language use within social media. Rarer still are 
studies that examine relationships between politicians’ communication networks in social media 
and political outcomes.2 This vacuum in the political science literature is no longer acceptable: 
elected officials are capitalizing on the inexpensive and personalizing qualities of social media to 
stay in contact with constituents and relay information. Properly categorizing and thus 
understanding such communication is a major challenge. 
                                                
2 Still rarer are attempts to examine these relationships leading up to elections, and we have this planned for the 
elections in November 2012.  
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The following examples, collected on October 26, 2011 and tweeted by Senator Robert 
Menendez and Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, respectively, are illustrative of officials’ 
use of Twitter: 
SenatorMenendez: “Pres @BarackObama is right, #WeCantWait to lower education costs + make 
college more affordable for #NJ families http://t.co/r7yuPKMK” 
RosLehtinen: “Thanks to Dean Acosta and Director Stack for hosting a great event! 
http://t.co/877KqXNq” 
We treat posts like these as individual speech acts and recognize that they accomplish a 
number of tasks beyond simply describing the world. We use a Process Coding (Saldana 2009) 
approach to code tweets according the actions they are trying to accomplish – e.g., positioning 
the author in relation to a political issue, narrating an individual’s day, or establishing a social 
connection with someone else. The examples above illustrate two of the actions for which we 
coded tweets: Senator Menendez positions himself in relation to President Obama and with 
regard to education costs, while Representative Ros-Lehtinen’s tweet is pro-social, thanking 
others for their actions. Both tweets also direct their audiences to more information by providing 
URLs.  
These examples illustrate that what officials say and to whom are just two aspects of their 
communication behavior. What those speech acts accomplish, or try to accomplish, is also 
important. We have found that voting patterns and positions within Twitter-based networks are 
correlated with the actions indicated in Twitter posts, and our efforts provide a much-needed link 
between officials’ language behaviors within a specific medium (i.e., Twitter), their social 
affiliations (i.e., networks), and their political behaviors (e.g., voting).  
Our project builds on earlier research by expanding both the scale and scope of inquiry. 
Our dataset (29,000+ tweets) is far larger than earlier datasets of either Congressional Twitter 
posts (Golbeck, Grimes, & Rogers, 2010) or politicians’ web pages (Xenos and Foot 2005), 
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enabling us to address questions of the consistency and generalizability of results raised earlier. 
Analysis of elected officials in the context of social media has also been limited to how they 
address redistributive goals or how traditional media affects them (Golbeck, et al., 2010; Xenos 
and Foot, 2005). In sum, ours is the first examination of this scale and scope of the relationships 
between social media use and political behavior among elected officials, although preliminary 
analysis has been done of broad network structures (e.g., (Hsu and Park 2012) for the Korean 
case). Given the relational nature of politics (Lazer, 2011) and ongoing studies of political 
communication which fail to address the strategies of policy makers (Auer 2011), Twitter-based 
networks and the interactions that occur within them provide an interesting and valuable natural 
experiment. 
Our project also provides a much-needed revision to existing measures of polarization in 
politics. Discussions of polarizing behavior of members of Congress are typically based on 
congressional voting records (Carroll et al. 2011; K. T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal 1984). On a 
more fundamental level, though, these data fail to capture the underlying signals and heresthetics 
which now inform us of political ideology. Below, we account for such signals by developing a 
coding scheme of Twitter content and constructing measures which are useful for analyzing 
political communication at a deeper level. 
Political Communication 
Using social media as a means of communicating to the larger public effectively 
supplements communication that was previously only possible through traditional media outlets 
(Cook et al. 1983; Edwards III and Wood 1999; Entman 2007; Kedrowski 2000; Lee 2009) or, 
more recently, websites and blogs that reported statements and speeches of public officials 
(Gentzkow and Jesse M Shapiro 2010). Because Twitter allows public officials to avoid the 
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filters of traditional media and communicate directly to their followers, the negative effects of 
incomplete information held by voters can be exacerbated.3 Such effects are already produced 
via traditional media outlets (Gentzkow and Jesse M Shapiro 2010), but there is no evidence of 
how a direct line from members of Congress to constituents might predict problems from 
incomplete information. Our research, thus, opens the door for making predictions about how 
public officials’ frequent use of polarizing statements may promote misconceptions about 
specific political or policy-related issues. Consider, for example, the following statements made 
with regard to health care reform: 
RepPaulRyan: “A1: Thx! Our plan: no more empty promises; saves Medicare w no changes 4 
those 54+ & real reform 4 next generation #ryanttv” 
YvetteClarke: “I will continue to defend Social Security and Medicare from attacks by 
Republicans in Congress.” 
Each statement approaches the issue from opposite directions, and they both contain 
language which attempts to strengthen the speakers’ positions while weakening countering 
viewpoints. 
The most significant implication for the voting public relying on incomplete information 
is that polarized voters are more active (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). Polarized voters can 
also be made more consistent (Gentzkow and Jesse M Shapiro 2010) and are even more 
“correct” in how they vote (Levendusky 2009). Our analysis of political communication via 
Twitter, thus, helps advance a political communication theory which accounts for the effects of 
micro-blogging efforts on party and social group formation. Existing studies attempting to 
predict political candidate success in elections (Lau, Andersen, and Redlawsk 2008) or 
portraying public sentiment about candidates (Baum and Groeling 2008) focus primarily on 
                                                
3 For example, traditional media must adhere to standards of accountability including but not limited to fact-
checking and source verification. When these standards are not met or if violations occur, traditional media issue a 
retraction. In the case of Twitter, public officials issue retractions and engage in fact-checking at their own 
discretion. 
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network size and strength of ties (Baum and Groeling 2008). We do, too, and apply them for the 
first time ever to public officials’ statements. 
Speech Acts 
In putting forward the concept of a speech act, Austin (1962) proposed that 
communication between humans is often much more than a means to transfer information from a 
speaker (sender) to a hearer (recipient). We are often trying to achieve a particular goal when we 
speak, and these underlying actions are referred to as being speech acts (Bach 1998). Similarly, a 
question of particular interest in our work is what an official achieves (or is trying to achieve) 
when he or she posts a given tweet. In other words, we can approach the analysis of officials’ 
tweets using the concept of the speech act. 
Extending Austin’s concept, Searle (1969) proposed a taxonomy of speech acts, in which 
there are five key categories. Table 1 provides a brief explanation of Searle’s categories, as well 
as an example of a tweet from our data set that would fall into each category. One challenge in 
using Searle’s speech acts to analyze tweets, is that in his scheme, speech act categories are 
mutually exclusive; he assumes that any new speech act uttered by a speaker will fall into only 
one of the above categories. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Two previous studies shared goals similar to those of our current work. In particular, 
Baron and colleagues (Baron et al. 2005) and Nastri and colleagues (Nastri, Pena, and Hancock 
2006) analyzed away messages used in instance messaging. Like tweets, away messages are 
relatively short texts and often serve multiple communicative purposes. For instance Baron et al. 
(2005) found that most away messages are designed in order to inform recipients of the sender’s 
whereabouts or thoughts, at the same time entertaining them. While Nastri and colleagues (2006) 
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point out that the mutually exclusive nature of Searle’s speech acts is problematic in the context 
of their analysis of away messages, since the messages typically serve multiple purposes. Their 
approach in analyzing messages is to allow for multiple speech acts within an individual 
message, with each speech act coded for exactly one of Searle’s categories. 
In contrast to previous work, we do not attempt to classify tweets into one of five of 
Searle’s speech acts. Instead, we developed our own coding scheme for tweet “action,” as will be 
explained. While inspired by the concept of speech act, the codes in our scheme are not mutually 
exclusive, and allow us to better capture what officials are trying to accomplish when they post a 
tweet. 
Social Media and Networks 
Where available, research on Twitter use in Congress is primarily descriptive, looking at 
length of Twitter adoption rates by followers of members of Congress (Boutyline and Willer 
2011; Himelboim, McCreery, and Smith 2011) or determining that tweeting is often concentrated 
in the hands of only a few politicians (Kim and Park 2012). Twitter followers have also been 
found to aggregate into politically homogeneous or homophilous groups (Siegel 2011). With the 
U.S. government being clearly divided along party lines, we entertain this possibility and predict 
that public officials will create homophilous communication networks via Twitter and produce 
echo chambers in which they speak primarily to one another. 
Our approach provides a methodological innovation: existing Twitter-based research 
relies extensively on adoption rates and followers, but such measures have been superseded by 
more appropriate measures (e.g., “mentions,” “replies,” and TwitterRank) to measure network 
characteristics (Siegel 2011). We incorporate these newer measures as an example of what is 
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now both methodologically feasible and also theoretically salient: the more active a member of 
Congress is, the more central his/her role within the Congressional tweeting network. 
Positioning statements also function as drivers for prompting responses from other actors 
in the political sphere (Kim and Park 2012).  At an exploratory level, we intend to show the 
pattern of such statements in Twitter and how they predict polarizing voting behavior in 
Congress. We are particularly interested in the combined effects of positioning speech acts and 
conventional political variables on polarizing behavior. 
Acknowledging the propensity for the public to have preconceived views about the 
source of information (McClain 2009; Ng and Detenber 2006; Papacharissi 2004), we also 
consider whether officials’ networks grow in size and/or in strength of support with the action of 
their statements. We focus specifically on statements that do positioning work or pro-social 
work. For instance, YvetteClark’s tweet above is an example of a positioning statement. She 
positions herself in relation to an issue, Social Security and Medicare, and in relation to a group, 
Republicans. RosLehtinen’s tweet, on the other hand, does pro-social work by thanking others. 
We expect that pro-social speech behavior will reliably predict political centrism and that 
positioning behavior correlates with extremism. 
Hypotheses 
Based on the related literature, our apparent interest in social network analysis, and the 
required attempt to understand and explain at a highly sophisticated level how members of 
Congress use social media for political communication, we propose the following hypotheses: 
H1. Twitter is a virtual echo chamber in which officials interact mainly with themselves and 
create homophilous networks. 
H2. A member of Congress’s location in the network is significantly predicted by both 
Twitter-based and non-Twitter-based characteristics. 
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H3. The degree to which members of Congress are followed and befriended is a positive 
function of positioning and pro-social statements via Twitter and polarizing voting 
records. 
H4. Polarizing voting records are particularly reflected by positioning and pro-social 
statements via Twitter. 
Method 
This section presents details of the methods used to collect and code the Twitter-based 
data and to test each of the hypotheses mentioned above. Our first task was to identify Twitter 
accounts for members of Congress, based on listings at Congress.org.4 We then hired workers 
through Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to collect and recheck Twitter screen names for all members 
of Congress. Mturk, increasingly leveraged by researchers to collect and evaluate the quality of 
social science data (e.g., (Bakshy, et al., 2011; Cha, et al., 2010; Weng, et al., 2010), is a 
marketplace in which requesters hire workers to complete small, self-contained tasks that require 
human intelligence. We paid workers on MTurk a set fee ($0.06) for each Twitter screen name 
they could find, hired two or more workers to look up each official, and then compared their 
responses. In cases where the workers disagreed about the screen name, we checked the official 
by hand on their websites and on Twitter. 411 accounts were verified. 
Using the Twitter Database Server (Green 2011) and Twitter-collectors (Hemphill 2011), 
we gathered 29,694 tweets posted by 411 elected members of Congress between June 14, 2011 
and August 23, 2011. Twitter usage generates networks when users establish “follow,” “reply,” 
and “mention” relationships with one another. Network analysis via UCINet (Borgatti, et al., 
2002) and NodeXL (Smith, et al. 2010) enables us to analyze those networks to reveal insights 
into a group’s dynamics. For instance, we can compare the networks of elected officials to 
                                                
4 http://www.congress.org/congressorg/directory/congdir.tt 
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determine whether they reach the public through Twitter or whether they establish a virtual 
“echo chamber” in which they reach only themselves, which is precisely outlined by H1. 
Additionally, following someone on Twitter allows a user to be updated every time the followed 
user tweets and thus enables a passive, peripheral awareness of another user’s contributions. 
Mentioning, on the other hand, is an active, deliberate communicative act in which one user 
directs a comment to another or explicitly references another user in his own tweet.  
We construct below both “follows” and “mentions” networks for the officials we studied 
in order to compare at an exploratory level how members of Congress interact within social 
media. This is but the first step in what we expect will be a continuing analysis of networks both 
offline (e.g., legislative committee-based or campaign finance-based) and online. There are 
several methods for measuring influence or centrality within a network (Borgatti and Martin G 
Everett 2006),5 but we are partial towards betweenness, which is determined by first calculating 
the shortest path between all the pairs of vertices and then by summing the fraction of shortest 
paths between all pairs that go through the vertex in question. We normalize this betweenness 
measure in order to make comparisons between two networks and identify uniquely situated 
individuals.6 For example, nodes that fall between different clusters of individuals provide a 
unique understanding of political communication and behavior: they lie on the shortest path 
between the less-connected nodes of the less-connected individuals of the established clusters 
and by virtue of their position at the intersection of social groups are generally members of more 
social groups than those with low betweenness. Such individuals are said to be weakly connected 
(Granovetter 1983), but there is still something inherently valuable in the way such ties 
                                                
5 The most common are degree, betweenness, plainness, and eigenvector. Betweenness is often used as a measure of 
influence within a network (Davis, Yoo, and Baker 2003; Newman 2005). 
6 The normalization process is determined by the following equation: (n-1)/centrality*100, where n is the number of 
individuals. 
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contribute to the inflow of political information (Granovetter 1983) and how they occupy 
structural holes or places in the graph where if that person were removed, the graph would no 
longer be connected. Finally, high betweenness individuals often have a lot of influence because 
of the diversity of their connections: they have access to all the social groups of which they are a 
member, and their messages/connections experience less decay because they do not have to 
travel as far to reach audiences. 
To test H1, we use network analysis to determine the direction and audience of tweets. If 
H1 holds, we will detect more links among members of the same political party than between 
members of different parties. 
Our test of H2 is based principally on how betweenness is predicted. We collect each 
Congressman’s number of friends, followers, and tweets for the period under analysis, which we 
have established above as being the most salient explanatory variables from Twitter. We also 
predict that betweenness is also impacted by conventional political demographics: legislative 
branch membership, gender, and party affiliation. Together, these two sets show whether or not a 
Congressman is a good conduit for information, opinion, or other content flowing over the 
network. When a network is relatively dense, we suspect that these conduits represent key voting 
positions. They are, after all, the people who can be targeted if one’s intention is to have a 
message passed along to a group that could not otherwise be reached.  
With regard to H3 and H4, our method of identifying positioning and pro-social 
statements is the result of an iterative process of establishing inter-coder reliability across a 
spectrum of action-based categories. As well, to see how the speaker of such statements 
correlates with his/her peripheral location in the network, we must first establish that the network 
exhibits core-periphery qualities and then look at correlation patterns. We used three rounds of 
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coding to develop a robust coding scheme for the action taken in tweets. The resulting scheme 
used six codes – narrating, positioning, directing to information, requesting action, giving thanks, 
and other – to categorize the kind of action taken in a tweet. Codes were not mutually exclusive 
meaning a tweet could be coded as exhibiting more than one action. For example, “Today is 
Medicare's 45th Anniversary. House GOP have a plan to preserve it, others just criticize & let it 
go bankrupt http://t.co/tQnsRGu,” a tweet from RepDaveCamp, was coded as both positioning 
and directing to information. We calculated Cohen’s kappa scores for each code and found very 
strong agreement between coders. The code definitions, examples, and kappas are reported in 
Table 1. Positioning and directing to information were by far the most common actions exhibited 
on Twitter. 
[Insert Table 2] 
The sample of tweets on which we test H3 and H4 is both stratified and selective. This 
was necessary because, first, we wanted to focus on the most revealing groups within those 
members of Congress using Twitter. We look specifically at those whose tweeting patterns are 
either at the highest or lowest ends of the spectrum of Congressional Twitter use. Second, the 
labor-intensive nature of hand-coding each tweet using the action coding scheme described 
above makes it difficult if not impossible to automate the coding process.7 We take a stratified 
sample of the population using three criteria. First, to fall into the qualifying category, members 
of Congress must, during the June, July, and August 2011 period, be among the ten most and the 
ten least tweeting, followed, and friended among all Congressional tweeters. There is some 
                                                
7 Using MALLET (http://mallet.cs.umass.edu/) and related software, we are now attempting to generate an 
algorithm that automatically codes tweets by exploiting their linguistic characteristics. It is still unclear whether that 
will be possible without losing some of the richness of the data produced via manual methods such as those applied 
here. 
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overlap between members falling into the three top-ten and bottom-ten groups, respectively, but 
only one stratified sample per qualifying individual is taken. 
The dependent variable for H3 and H4 – political voting in Congress – is the existing and 
widely used DW-Nominate measure (Carroll et al. 2011; K. T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal 
1984) and we use the available data for the 111th Congress. Because the DW-Nominate measure 
can only be calculated after a Congress has completed, there are a number of senators and 
representatives who are newly elected and, thus, have no DW-Nominate scores. From the 
aforementioned stratified sample, members of Congress without DW-Nominate scores include 
Representatives Walsh, Landry, Gardner, and Amash and Senators Blunt and Ayotte. 
Results 
Our results are divided into two sections. First, we test H1 and H2 using network 
analysis. Following, we engage in an analysis of the complex relationships between positioning 
and pro-social statements and political variables. This second stage integrates the language-
specific variables for the H3 and H4 tests but makes very explicit predictions about the 
relationships between these variables and betweenness. We then make a formal test of H5 to see 
whether Twitter statements predict the polarizing voting of members of Congress. That is, do 
members of Congress do what they say?  
Social Network Analysis 
We make two exploratory observations about the Congressional tweeting network. First, 
the transitivity of the Congress mention network is low. Transitivity is a measure of the triad 
consensus in the graph, i.e., how often two of an individual’s connections are connected to each 
other. In small worlds, we would expect transitivity to be higher than normal. The Congress 
mention network does indeed has higher transitivity (0.229) than a random network of the same 
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size and density (0.012); yet, transitivity between 0.3 and 0.6 is “normal” for graphs though, so 
this one can still be considered low (Faust 2006; Newman, D J Watts, and Strogatz 2002). 
Second, the degree of separation between members of Congress is six, which is surprising in 
such a closed network. On the basis of these two point, we might conclude that members of 
Congress are not using Twitter to explicitly position themselves in terms of others. This provides 
additional evidence in support of existing research which shows that politicians, albeit 
campaigning ones, are more likely to provide only the most basic issue-related information 
online while avoiding most other forms of issue dialogue (Huckfeldt et al. 1995). Without formal 
analysis of the positioning efforts of members of Congress, these findings are still premature. 
Figures 1 and 2 show, respectively, the networks resulting from officials mentioning and 
officials following one another. In both figures, blue solid squares represent Democrats, and red 
hollow circles represent Republicans. The lone Independent Senator is a yellow solid disc and is 
visible only in the mentions network (Figure 1), but there is no real role of third parties, 
confirming Xenos and Foot (2005). The darkness of the lines connecting each node depends on a 
measure of the strength of that relationship. In the mentions network, the darkness of a line is 
determined by the number of times two individuals mention one another, and darker lines 
indicate more frequent mentioning. In the follows network (Figure 2), gray lines indicate one-
way connections (i.e., one official follows another who does not follow him) while black lines 
represent reciprocal relationships (i.e., both officials follow each other). Edge opacity here 
indicates the number of mentions, and the dark self-loops on some nodes indicate that officials 
frequently mention themselves.   
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
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A division between parties is visible in both graphs. In the mentions graph (Figure 1), we 
can see that lines connecting Republicans to each other are darker, indicating that Republicans 
mention one another more often than Democrats do. Earlier research that explored similar 
mentioning behaviors among political bloggers (using links between blogs to indicate 
connections) found a similar pattern – conservative bloggers also linked to each other more often 
(Adamic and Glance 2005). The division between parties in the follows graph (Figure 2) is 
starker. There, we see clear clusters of Democrats and Republicans with fewer links between 
them. We also see isolates (nodes that do not connect to any others) and two large, disconnected 
components (subgraphs that are connected to each other but not to the rest of the graph). The 
smaller component on the left of Figure 2 shows a less clear division between parties. 
Differences in the strength of relationships are visible in both graphs as well. In the 
mentions graph, the lines connecting Republicans are darker, indicating that they mentioning 
each other more often. In the follows network, the large component has more black lines, 
indicating reciprocal relationships, than does the smaller component. Taken in tandem with our 
earlier evidence, a lack of transitivity suggests a lack of hierarchy in this network. With no 
evidence of hierarchy and no evidence of a core-periphery structure, the network does not 
display any immediately apparent structure. 
The follows network is nearly ten times as dense as the mentions network (0.134 vs 
0.014, respectively), indicating that officials are passively connected to far more people than the 
number of people they are actively connected to. This pattern is not surprising – it makes sense 
that we can only engage with some subset of the people we know or are aware of. What is 
interesting is that in both cases, the density of the graph is surprisingly low. In a network of 
actors who are so similar and who, in theory, work together, we would expect to see a much 
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higher density. Instead, we see that, at a maximum, only thirteen percent of the possible 
connections are made, indicating that even though officials clearly use Twitter, they underutilize 
the ability to passively monitor one another’s behaviors. 
These graphs cannot tell us why officials choose to follow or mention such a small subset 
of their peers, although other research on Twitter during Congressional campaigns suggests that 
the density of the network correlates to the cohesion of the network’s message (Livne et al. 
2011). In other words, we would expect more cohesion among those who are part of a network 
with a united front. 
Twitter Statements & Political Determinants 
As was stated above, people with high betweenness are generally members of more social 
groups than those with low betweenness, occupying structural holes and playing potential key 
roles in the political process. In an attempt to further understand the impact of a member of 
Congress having higher numbers of followers and friends as well as tweeting with greater 
frequency, we statistically analyze the relationship between betweenness and the characteristics 
of members of Congress. Specifically, we are interested in the relationship between networks 
measured by normalized betweenness and each Congress member’s number of followers, 
number of friends, and number of tweets in the data collection period.  
In this way, we are able to test H2 with the understanding that betweenness is a function 
of followers, friends, and number of tweets. If any of these positively predict betweenness in the 
network, there is some semblance of a core-periphery structure, albeit not in the conventional 
network analytical sense. These relationships are also predicted by party affiliation, branch of 
Congress, and gender, the latter two of which can be considered exploratory. 
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Based on the results of least squares regression for all members of Congress for which 
data is available (N = 374), without controlling for differences in gender, party, or branch, Table 
3, column 1 shows via ordered probit analysis that there are no statistically significant effects 
from a member of Congress having additional numbers of followers, friends, or tweets. The 
same is true when we account for differences in gender, party, and branch, shown in Table 2, 
column 3, although there are indications in columns 2 and 3 that branch significantly predicts 
betweenness. We code gender “1” for males and “0” for females, party “1” for Republicans and 
“0” for Democrats, and branch “1” for the Senate and “0” for the House. 
To understand such differences further and in the context of the number of a 
Congressman’s followers, friends, and tweets, interactions between each with gender, branch, 
and party are introduced in an attempt to eliminate confounding variables. In Table 3, column 4, 
where all possible interactions are included, it is shown that a large number of followers increase 
betweenness for females relative to males, but that a large number of friends increase 
betweenness for males relative to females. In terms of interactions between party and Twitter-
based network measure, the only significant difference between parties occurs with regard to the 
number of followers: as the number of followers increase, betweenness for Republicans 
increases relative to Democrats. This could be an indication of the tighter network effects and 
exclusivity among Republicans, possibly countering our earlier network analysis-based results of 
a strongly non-homophilous network. Finally, with regard to branch of Congress, a large number 
of followers increase betweenness for House members, while a large number of followers 
decreases betweenness for Senate members.  
In sum, these results present an image of specialized effects from each of the three 
Twitter-based measures (number of followers, friends, and tweets) based on gender, party, and 
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Congressional branch. In terms of the ability to convey messages across what has been 
determined to be a particularly unstructured network, communication is most likely through the 
most networked members of Congress: males with large numbers of Twitter friends; Republicans 
with large numbers of Twitter followers; House members with large numbers of Twitter 
followers. 
[Insert Table 3] 
We include now our content analysis in order to test H3 and H4, and Table 3 presents the 
ordered probit regression output for predicting the same three qualities of Twitter users: 
followers ranking, friends ranking, and ranking based on the number of tweets made during the 
summer of 2011. We have established that the core-periphery structure is not in effect, but the 
results from Table 4 show that, even if it were present, positioning statements would not be 
correlated with peripheral locations in a network. This conclusion is based on the fact that 
positioning tweets positively predict a higher rank in terms of a member of Congress’s followers 
(Table 4, columns 1 and 2) and friends (Table 4, columns 4 and 5). Indeed, our results in Table 4 
show that follower and friend rankings are most consistently and positively affected by 
positioning: narrative tweets reduce one’s ranking while providing information increase one’s 
ranking in followers but reduces one’s ranking in friends. On this basis, we induce and update 
our earlier theory with the statement that followers and friends are much more likely indicators 
of having a solid social media base in terms of the Congressional Twitter network.  
Further, where the results from our ordered probit regressions are statistically significant, 
the followers and friends rankings seem to be closely related. The exception is content that 
provides information. In this case, members of Congress who provide information will have a 
higher ranking on the follower scale but a lower ranking on the friends scale. We can infer, thus, 
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that the this Congressmen is more focused on releasing information than in receiving it since a 
Twitter accounts “friends” are the accounts it follows, the people from whom a user receives 
information. Content which is positioning, however, does have an impact on both followers and 
friends ranking, indicating that, for those members of Congress who are interested in establishing 
a solid following in social media, they should make positioning statements. 
In Table 3, we observed that the number of tweets does not predict at a significant level 
normalized betweenness among members of Congress. These results are further strengthened in 
Table 4, columns 7-9, which show that the amount of tweeting is not positively predicted across 
the bulk of our explanatory variables. We conclude, thus, that the frequency of tweeting has little 
to do with garnering a political following based on statements and behavior, and that very little 
predicts tweeting rank beyond members of Congress who are male and Republican. 
Providing explicit confirmation of H3, Table 4 also shows that polarizing behavior in the 
form of Congressional voting records has a positive effect on the strength of members of 
Congress’ social media base. In Table 4, columns 2 and 4, DW-Nominate positively and 
significantly predicts the rank of followers and friends for members of Congress.8 To fully test 
H3, we also showed the combined effects of polarized voting and Twitter statements, presented 
in columns 3 and 6 for the rank of followers and friends, which have been established now as our 
dependent variables of interest. Positioning tweets, as described above, have consistent effects 
for both the followers and friends ranking. For the effects on both the followers and friends 
rankings, the interaction between polarizing behavior and statements is positive and statistically 
significant and marginally larger for the followers ranking. 
                                                
8 Of less importance but nonetheless statistically significant, polarizing behavior decreases one's tweeting rank, 
implying that the most polarized members of Congress (in terms of voting records as well as in terms of statements) 
do not tweet with great frequency. 
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[Insert Table 4] 
Having established the significance of polarizing voting in Congress for our three 
qualities Twitter-based ranking measures, we can now make a devoted test of H4. Using the log-
transformed measure of DW-Nominate as the dependent variable and proxy for polarizing 
voting, we see in Table 5, column 1, that positioning increases polarizing voting by 9 percent 
(after back-transforming the coefficient). Providing information increases polarizing voting by 
7.1 percent while thanks decreases polarizing voting by over 27.4 percent. These findings are 
statistically significant and robust to the inclusion of White’s standard errors, but the fit of this 
model (R2 = 0.04) is less than desirable. This is somewhat alleviated after controlling for 
variance across three key characteristics of members of Congress: gender, party, and chamber (of 
Congress). 
We now see in Table 5, column 2, that positioning continues to remain statistically 
significant and that male Republican House members are most likely to vote in a polarizing 
manner. Our exploratory analysis of the combined effects of positioning speech acts and political 
or demographic variables is also informative. For this, we include interactions between gender, 
party, and chamber of Congress and positioning tweets. Table 5, column 6, for example, presents 
all three of these interactions simultaneously and shows that polarized voting increases with 
position tweets for females by 42.5 percent (relative to males); for Republicans by 17.8 percent 
(relative to Democrats); and for members of the Senate by 18.7 percent (relative to members of 
the House).  
[Insert Table 5] 
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Conclusion 
Communication via social media is an increasingly common way for elected officials to 
convey their views. Our observations above, particularly the lack of closeness in Congressional 
networks and the absence of a core-periphery structure are surprising. It certainly indicates that 
we must be innovative in our attempts to understand and properly identify the function of social 
media in political communication. As of yet, though, there does not seem to be an overly 
coordinated effort among members of Congress to establish themselves within the Congressional 
Twitter network. Such findings have been identified only in partial form here, and we 
acknowledge that future study is needed to fully address differences in party affiliation. 
We also acknowledge that future study must deal with the disconnected components in 
both Figures 1 and 2. Exactly who is not connecting, and why? What is preventing Democrats 
and Republicans from talking? And is there a pattern to the reciprocal relationships; e.g., are 
Democrats following Republicans but not getting followed in return? The answers to these 
questions are expected to be answered with a much more comprehensive look at the statements 
used by tweeters. Coding for such tweets is crucial in assessing the degree to which compromise 
and statements are correlated. In many ways, thus, this is a preliminary analysis lacking in its 
ability to properly compare uncompromising behavior, e.g., Congressional voting patterns, with 
uncompromising statements. This will also help set up what are expected to be networks of 
polarizing language which have heretofore been identified only through inference or anecdote.  
Though our results provide many avenues for future work, it is important to recognize 
our findings thus far. When testing H1, we found mixed results. While Congress showed a slight 
degree of homophily, other features of the network such as density were more telling. With 
regard to H2, we found no statistically significant effects from a member of Congress having 
additional numbers of followers, friends, or tweets on his or her betweenness centrality in the 
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network. When testing H3, we found polarizing behavior in the form of Congressional voting 
records has a positive effect on the strength of members of Congress’ social media base. Finally, 
the results of our test of H4 confirm that positioning speech acts increase polarizing voting. 
Overall, we found interesting correlations between Congress’ social media behavior and their 
voting behavior, demonstrating that social media is ripe for political communication studies. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1     Congressional mentions network 
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Figure 2     Congressional follows network 
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Table 1. Searle's (1969) five categories of speech acts 
Category Explanation Tweet example 
Assertives Speaker makes a statement; 
asserts that it is true. 
Joining Dr. Bill Bennett's 
Morning in America radio show 
in a few moments. 
Directives Speaker calls hearer to action, 
without committing self to 
action. 
Repeal your unconstitutional 
appointments. #SOTU 
Commissives Speaker commits self to doing 
some action. 
I will be holding 3 town halls this 
Feb. 24 in #Kansas 
http://t.co/8rB2TuSd 
Expressives Speaker expresses feelings or 
emotion to hearer. 
@owaizdadabhoy, love you all in 
Yorba Linda. Back home in my 
beloved freezy Minnesota. 
Declaratives Speaker changes or determines 
a state of affairs within an 
institution in which s/he holds 
some power. 
I will not only vote against 
moving [PIPA] forward next 
week but also remove my 
cosponsorship of the bill. 
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Table 2. Definitions and examples of qualitative action codes 
Code Definition N Cohen’s 
kappa 
Narrating Telling a story about their day, describing activities 173 0.83 
Positioning Situating one's self in relation to another politician or 
political issue, may be implied rather than explicit 
405 0.87 
Directing to 
information 
Pointing to a resource URL, telling you where you can get 
more info 
465 0.70 
Requesting 
action 
Explicitly telling followers to go do something online or in 
person (not just visiting a link but asking them to do 
something like sign a petition, apply, vote) - look for action 
verbs 
15 0.70 
Thanking Says nice things about or thanks someone else, e.g. 
congratulations, compliments 
57 0.90 
Other Doesn’t fit in any other Action category, or one can't tell 
what they're doing 
20 - 
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Table 3. Predicting betweenness 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3)  
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
 Normalized 
betweenness 
Normalized 
betweenness 
Normalized 
betweenness 
Normalized 
betweenness 
Followers -7.53e-10 
(9.39e-09) 
 1.41e-09 
(9.70e-09) 
2.74e-07*** 
(7.88e-08) 
Friends 1.28e-08 
(2.63e-07) 
 1.88e-08 
(2.69e-07) 
-2.68e-06*** 
(7.47e-07) 
Tweets 5.94e-06 
(3.89e-06) 
 5.92e-06 
(3.91e-06) 
7.80e-07 
(5.03e-06) 
Male  -0.0004 
(0.0019) 
-0.0007 
(0.0019) 
-0.0014 
(0.0017) 
Repub.  0.0019 
(0.0013) 
0.0003 
(0.0013) 
-0.0021 
(0.0016) 
Senate  -0.0027*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0039** 
(0.0016) 
0.0025 
(0.0020) 
Follow* 
Male 
   -1.23e-07 
(1.61e-07) 
Friends* 
Male 
   1.94e-06** 
(7.78e-07) 
Tweets* 
Male 
   -4.72e-07 
(5.35e-06) 
Follow* 
Repub 
   3.86e-07** 
(1.94e-07) 
Friends* 
Repub 
   -2.83e-07 
(7.03e-07) 
Tweets* 
Repub 
   3.90e-06 
(2.49e-06) 
Follow* 
Senate 
   -5.42e-07*** 
(2.06e-07) 
Friends* 
Senate 
   7.57e-07 
(6.67e-07) 
Tweets* 
Senate 
   -2.22e-06 
(3.71e-06) 
N  374 374 374 374 
F-stat 0.85 3.16** 1.09 4.86*** 
R2 0.1007 0.0075 0.1059 0.3105 
  
Note: ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. For ease of 
identification, statistically significant coefficients and standard errors are in bold font. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
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Table 4. Understanding the determinants of Twitter-based characteristics 
 (1) 
Ordered 
probit 
(2) 
Ordered 
probit 
(3) 
Ordered 
probit 
(4) 
Ordered 
probit 
(5) 
Ordered 
probit 
(6) 
Ordered 
probit 
(7) 
Ordered 
probit 
(8) 
Ordered 
probit 
(9) 
Ordered 
probit 
 Followers 
rank 
Followers 
rank 
Followers 
rank 
Friends 
rank 
Friends 
rank 
Friends 
rank 
Tweeting 
rank 
Tweeting 
rank 
Tweeting 
rank 
Narrative 
 
-0.1450 
(0.1011) 
-0.1054 
(0.1065) 
-0.0856 
(0.1068) 
-0.2210** 
(0.0966) 
-0.1753* 
(0.1032) 
-0.1598 
(0.1035) 
-0.3399*** 
(0.1142) 
-0.3355*** 
(0.1193) 
-0.3359*** 
(0.1196) 
Positioning 
 
0.1859** 
(0.0858) 
0.1476* 
(0.0904) 
-0.3517 
(0.2264) 
0.1399* 
(0.0818) 
0.0771 
(0.0875) 
-0.4011* 
(0.2284) 
-0.1376 
(0.0952) 
-0.1122 
(0.1002) 
-0.1005 
(0.2725) 
Providing info 0.2284*** 
(0.0826) 
0.2926*** 
(0.0867) 
0.2843*** 
(0.0868) 
-0.4409*** 
(0.0806) 
-0.4399*** 
(0.0856) 
-0.4500*** 
(0.0857) 
-0.3475*** 
(0.0924) 
-0.3363*** 
(0.0968) 
-0.3362*** 
(0.0969) 
Requesting 
action 
0.2275 
(0.2843) 
0.14769 
(0.2936) 
0.1490 
(0.2936) 
0.5020* 
(0.2860) 
0.4140 
(0.3002) 
0.4142 
(0.3003) 
0.3201 
(0.3178) 
0.4061 
(0.3255) 
0.4060 
(0.3255) 
Thanks 
 
0.0835 
(0.1613) 
0.2281 
(0.1743) 
0.1906 
(0.1752) 
-0.0567 
(0.1546) 
0.0150 
(0.1693) 
-0.0179 
(0.1698) 
-0.2547 
(0.1798) 
-0.3428* 
(0.1962) 
-0.3420* 
(0.1969) 
Other 
 
-0.0771 
(0.2712) 
0.0149 
(0.2783) 
0.0309 
(0.2788) 
0.0535 
(0.2499) 
0.0881 
(0.2588) 
0.1062 
(0.2590) 
-0.2906 
(0.2812) 
-0.3369 
(0.2927) 
-0.3370 
(0.2927) 
Male 
 
-0.7484*** 
(0.1074) 
-1.5310*** 
(0.1318) 
-1.5284*** 
(0.1320) 
-0.2264** 
(0.1044) 
-0.8505*** 
(0.1276) 
-0.8416*** 
(0.1276) 
1.0943*** 
(0.1563) 
1.1565*** 
(0.1744) 
1.1562*** 
(0.1745) 
Republican 
 
1.2018*** 
(0.0969) 
1.4472*** 
(0.1155) 
1.4117*** 
(0.1165) 
0.8278*** 
(0.0914) 
1.2013*** 
(0.1142) 
1.1686*** 
(0.1150) 
0.2225** 
(0.1044) 
0.3755*** 
(0.1187) 
0.3762*** 
(0.1197) 
Senate 
 
1.0222*** 
(0.0934) 
1.4420*** 
(0.1054) 
1.4203*** 
(0.1058) 
0.2382*** 
(0.0883) 
0.6176*** 
(0.1004) 
0.6008*** 
(0.1008) 
0.1441 
(0.1033) 
0.0881 
(0.1100) 
0.0887 
(0.1107) 
DW 
Nominate 
 
 1.3480*** 
(0.2182) 
1.0324*** 
(0.2547) 
 0.8990*** 
(0.2153) 
0.5815** 
(0.2570) 
 -0.7140*** 
(0.2494) 
-0.7058** 
(0.3065) 
Positioning* 
DW 
Nominate 
  0.8574** 
(0.3563) 
  0.8190** 
(0.3614) 
  -0.0200 
(0.4319) 
N 791 711 711 791 711 711 791 711 711 
Chi2 221.33*** 346.09*** 351.88*** 122.57*** 211.27*** 216.41*** 94.69*** 93.86*** 93.87*** 
Pseudo R2 0.0739 0.1202 0.1222 0.0360 0.0708 0.0726 0.0436 0.0485 0.0485 
 
Note: ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
For ease of identification, statistically significant coefficients and standard errors are in bold font.
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Table 5. Predicting polarizing action in Congress with speech actions 
 (1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
OLS 
(6) 
OLS 
 log of 
polarizing 
votes  
(DW 
Nominate) 
log of 
polarizing 
votes (DW 
Nominate) 
log of 
polarizing 
votes (DW 
Nominate) 
log of 
polarizing 
votes (DW 
Nominate) 
log of 
polarizing 
votes (DW 
Nominate) 
log of 
polarizing 
votes (DW 
Nominate) 
Narrative 
 
-0.0504 
(0.0442) 
     
Positioning 
 
0.0870** 
(0.0399) 
0.1016*** 
(0.0296) 
0.3066*** 
(0.1035) 
0.0966** 
(0.0461) 
0.0745* 
(0.0423) 
0.2420** 
(0.1124) 
Providing 
info 
0.0695* 
(0.0391) 
     
Requesting 
action 
-0.1252 
(0.1747) 
     
Thanks 
 
-0.2426*** 
(0.0901) 
     
Other 
 
0.0858 
(0.1124) 
     
Male 
 
 0.3648*** 
(0.0492) 
0.4978*** 
(0.0851) 
0.3651*** 
(0.0490) 
0.3627*** 
(0.0498) 
0.5576*** 
(0.0833) 
Republican 
 
 0.3464*** 
(0.0288) 
0.3403*** 
(0.0285) 
0.3417*** 
(0.0444) 
0.3472*** 
(0.0286) 
0.2540*** 
(0.0430) 
Senate 
 
 -0.0626** 
(0.0282) 
-0.0626** 
(0.0284) 
-0.0627** 
(0.0282) 
-0.0989** 
(0.0420) 
-0.1495*** 
(0.0397) 
Positioning 
*Male 
  -0.2459** 
(0.1071) 
  -0.3544*** 
(0.1011) 
Positioning 
* Repub. 
   0.0090 
(0.0594) 
 0.1638*** 
(0.0561) 
Positioning 
* Senate 
    0.0728 
(0.0557) 
0.1716*** 
(0.0554) 
N 711 711 711 711 711 711 
F-stat 4.42*** 68.20*** 56.01*** 55.93*** 56.71*** 48.27*** 
R2 0.0421 0.3218 0.3312 0.3218 0.3232 0.3391 
 
Note: ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. For ease of 
identification, statistically significant coefficients and standard errors are in bold font. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
 
